We consider the general problem of a set of agents trading a portfolio of assets in the presence of transient price impact and additional quadratic transaction costs and we study, with analytical and numerical methods, the resulting Nash equilibria. Extending significantly the framework of Schied and Zhang (2018), who considered two agents and one asset, we focus our attention on the conditions on the value of transaction cost making the trading profile of the agents, and as a consequence the price trajectory, wildly oscillating and the market unstable. We find that the presence of more assets, the heterogeneity of trading skills (e.g. speed or cost), and a large number of agents make the market more prone to large oscillations and instability. When the number of assets is fixed, a more complex structure of the cross-impact matrix, i.e. the existence of multiple factors for liquidity, makes the market less stable compared to the case when a single liquidity factor exists.
Introduction
Instabilities in financial markets have always attracted the attention of researchers, policy makers and practitioners in the financial industry because of the role that financial crises have on the real economy. Despite this, a clear understanding of the sources of financial instabilities is still missing, in part probably because several origins exist and they are different at different time scales. The recent automation of the trading activity has raised many concerns about market instabilities occurring at short time scales (e.g. intraday), in part because of the attention triggered by the Flash Crash of May 6th, 2010 (Kirilenko et al. (2017) ) and the numerous other similar intraday instabilities observed in more recent years (Brogaard et al. (2018) , Calcagnile et al. (2018) , Golub et al. (2012) , Johnson et al. (2013) Trading, and market fragmentation in causing these events has been vigorously debated, both theoretically and empirically (Brogaard et al. (2018) , Golub et al. (2012) ).
One of the puzzling characteristics of market instabilities is that a large fraction of them appear to be endogenously generated, i.e. it is very difficult to find an exogenous event (e.g. a news) which can be considered at the origin of the instability (Cutler et al. (1989) , Fair (2002) , Joulin et al. (2008) ). Liquidity plays a crucial role in explaining these events. Markets are, in fact, far from being perfectly elastic and any order or trade causes prices to move, which in turn leads to a cost (termed slippage) for the investor. The relation between orders and price is called market impact. In order to minimize market impact cost, when executing a large volume it is optimal for the investor to split the order in smaller parts which are executed incrementally over the day or even across multiple days. The origin of the market impact cost is predatory trading (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) , Carlin et al. (2007) ): the knowledge that a trader is purchasing progressively a certain amount of assets can be used to make profit by buying at the beginning and selling at the end of the trader's execution. Part of the core strategy of HFTs is exactly predatory trading. Now, the combined effect on price of the trading of the predator and of the prey can lead to large price oscillations and market instabilities. In any case, it is clear that the price dynamics is the result of the (dynamical) equilibrium between the activity of two or more agents simultaneously trading.
This equilibrium can be studied by modeling the above setting as a market impact game (Carlin et al. (2007) , Lachapelle et al. (2016) , Moallemi et al. (2012) , Schied and Zhang (2018) , Schöneborn (2008) , Strehle (2017a,b) ). In a nutshell, in a market impact game, two traders want to trade the same asset in the same time interval. While trading, each agent modifies the price because of market impact, thus when two (or more) traders are simultaneously present, the optimal execution schedule of a trader should take into account the simultaneous presence of the other trader(s). As customary in these situations, the approach is to find the Nash equilibrium, which in general depends on the market impact model.
Market impact games are a perfect modeling setting to study endogenously generated market instabilities. A major step in this direction has been recently made by Schied and Zhang (2018) .
By using the transient impact model of Bouchaud et al. (2009 Bouchaud et al. ( , 2004 plus a quadratic temporary impact cost (which can alternatively be interpreted as a quadratic transaction cost, see below), they have recently considered a simple setting with two identical agents liquidating a single asset and derived the Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, they also derived analytically the conditions on the parameters of the impact model under which the Nash equilibrium displays huge oscillations of the trading volume and, as a consequence, of the price, thus leading to market instabilities 1 . Specifically, they proved the existence of a sharp transition between stable and unstable markets at specific values of the market impact parameters.
Although the paper of Schied and Zhang highlights an key mechanism leading to market instability, several important aspects are left unanswered. First, market instabilities rarely involve only one asset and, as observed for example during the Flash Crash, a cascade of instabilities affects very rapidly a large set of assets or the entire market (CFTC-SEC (2010) ). This is due to the fact that optimal execution strategies often involve a portfolio of assets rather than a single one (see, e.g. Tsoukalas et al. (2019) ). Moreover, commonality of liquidity across assets (Chordia et al. (2000) and cross-impact effects (Schneider and Lillo (2019) ) make the trading on one asset trigger price changes on other assets. Thus, it is natural to ask: is a large market more or less prone to market instabilities? How does the structure of cross-impact and therefore of liquidity commonality affect the market stability? A second class of open questions regards instead the market participants. Do the presence of more agents simultaneously trading one asset tends to stabilize the market? While the solution of Schied and Zhang considers only two traders, it is important to know whether having more agents is beneficial or detrimental to market stability. For example, regulators and exchanges could implement mechanisms to favor or disincentive participation during turbulent periods. Answering this question requires solving the impact game with a generic number of agents. Moreover, while in Schied and Zhang the two investors are identical, real markets are characterized by huge heterogeneity in trading skills. For example, some agents (e.g. HFTs) are much faster than others, some agents use more sophisticated trading strategies and have smaller trading costs, etc. Is this traders' heterogeneity beneficial to market stability? Do HFTs destabilize markets?
In this paper we extend considerably the setting of Schied and Zhang by answering the above research questions. Specifically, we consider (i) the case when the two agents trade multiple assets simultaneously and cross market impact is present; (ii) the case when J > 2 agents simultaneously trade one asset; (iii) the case when agents have different trading skills, either because the temporary or permanent impact paid by one agent is smaller than the one paid by the other or because one of the two agents (an HFT) is faster than the other in submitting orders. In each of these cases we derive the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding impact game.
Then we derive, either analytically or numerically, the conditions under which the market does display huge oscillations and is therefore unstable. The different 'paths' leading to market instability are therefore highlighted, finding, surprisingly, that larger, more competitive, and more heterogeneous markets are more prone to market instability.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some notation of the market impact games framework and we introduce definitions of market stability. We extend the basic model of Schied and Zhang (2018) to the multi-asset case in Section 3, where we find the Nash equilibrium and we analyse numerically the cross-impact effect. In Section 4 we study how the cross-impact matrix affects the market stability and we prove, under certain general structure of the cross-impact matrix, that market is asymptotically unstable. In Section 5 we extend the framework to the multi-agent case and finally in Section 6 we explore how the presence of heterogeneous agents, either in terms of cost or in terms of speed, may affect the market stability and the equilibrium.
Market Impact Games
Consider two traders who want to trade simultaneously a certain number of shares, minimizing the trading cost. Since the trading of one agent affects the price, the other agent must take into account the presence of the former in optimizing her execution. This problem is termed market impact game and has received considerable attention in recent years (Carlin et al. (2007) , Lachapelle et al. (2016) , Moallemi et al. (2012) , Schied and Zhang (2018) , Schöneborn (2008) , Strehle (2017a,b) ). The seminal paper by Schied and Zhang, (Schied and Zhang (2018) ), considers a market impact game between two identical agents trading the same asset in a given time period.
When none of the two agents trade, the price dynamics is described by the so called unaffected price process S 0 t which is a right-continuous martingale defined on a given probability space (Ω, (F t ) t≥0 , F , P). A trader wants to unwind a given initial position with inventory Z 0 , where a positive (negative) inventory means a short (long) position, during a given trading time grid T = {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t N }, where 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t N = T and following an admissible strategy, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Admissible Strategy). Given T and Z 0 , an admissible trading strategy for T and Z 0 ∈ R is a vector ζ = (ζ 0 , ζ 1 , . . . , ζ N ) of random variables such that:
• ζ i ∈ F t i and bounded, ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , N.
•
The random variable ζ k represents the order flow at trading time t k where positive (negative) flow corresponds to a sell (buy) trade of volume |ζ k |. We denote with X 0 and Y 0 the initial inventories of the two considered agents playing the game and with ξ = {ξ k } k∈T and η = {η k } k∈T their respective strategies.
Traders are subject to fees and transaction costs and their objective is to minimize them by optimizing the execution. As customary in the literature, the costs are modeled by two components. The first one is a temporary impact component modeled by a quadratic term θξ 2 k which does not affect the price dynamics. This is sometimes called slippage and depends on the immediate liquidity present in the order book. Notice that, as discussed in Schied and Zhang (2018) , this term can also be interpreted as a quadratic transaction fee. Here we do not specify exactly what this term represents, sticking to the mathematical modeling approach of Schied and Zhang.
The second component is related to permanent impact and affects future price dynamics. Following Schied and Zhang (2018) , we consider the celebrated transient impact model of Bouchaud et al. (2009 Bouchaud et al. ( , 2004 , which describes the price process S ξ,η t affected by the strategies ξ, η of the two traders, i.e.,
where G : R + → R is the so called decay kernel, which describes the lagged price impact of a unit buy or sell order over time. Usual assumptions on G are satisfied, i.e., it is convex, nonincreasing, nonconstant, and t → G(|t|) is strictly positive definite in the sense of Bochner.
Notice that by choosing a constant kernel G, one recovers the celebrated Almgren-Chriss model (Almgren and Chriss (2001) ).
The cost faced by each agent is the sum of the two components above. Specifically, let us denote with X (X 0 , T) the set of admissible strategies for the initial inventory X 0 on a specified time grid T, the cost functions are defined as:
Definition 2.2 (Schied and Zhang (2018) ). Given T = {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t N }, X 0 and Y 0 . Let (ε i ) i=0,1,...N be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli 1 2 -distributed random variables that are independent of σ( t≥0 F t ). Then the cost of ξ ∈ X (X 0 , T) given η ∈ X (Y 0 , T) is defined as
and the costs of η given ξ are
Thus the execution priority at time t k is given to the agent who wins an independent coin toss game, represented by a Bernoulli variable ε k , which is a fair game in the framework of Schied and Zhang (2018) . In this setting, the two agents are equally likely to arrive first in each interval. In Section 6 we study how the Nash equilibrium changes when this hypothesis is relaxed, i.e. one agent is "faster" than the other one, possibly because she is a HFT.
Given the time grid T = {t 0 , t 1 , . . . , t N } and the initial values X 0 , Y 0 ∈ R, we define the Nash Equilibrium as a pair (ξ * , η * ) of strategies in
One of main results of Schied and Zhang (2018) is the proof, under general assumptions, of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, they showed that this equilibrium is deterministically given by a linear combination of two constant vectors, namely
where the fundamental solutions v and w are defined as
and e = (1, . . . , 1) T ∈ R N +1 . The kernel matrix Γ ∈ R (N +1)×(N +1) is given by
and for θ ≥ 0 it is Γ θ := Γ + 2θI, and the matrix Γ is given by
As showed by Schied and Zhang (2018) all these matrices are definite positive.
An interesting result of Schied and Zhang (2018) concerns the stability of the Nash equilibrium related to the transaction costs parameter θ and the decay kernel G. Generically, following Schied and Zhang (2018) , we say that a market is unstable if the trading strategies at the Nash equilibrium exhibit spurious oscillations, i.e., if there exists a sequence of trading times such that the orders are consecutively composed by buy and sell trades. In the optimal execution literature such behavior is termed transaction triggered price manipulation, see Alfonsi et al. (2012) . Figure 1 shows the simulation of the price process under the Schied and Zhang model when both investors have an inventory equal to 1 for two values of θ. The unaffected price process is a simple random walk with zero drift and constant volatility and the trading of the two agents, according to the Nash equilibrium, modifies the price path. For small θ (top panel) the affected price process exhibits wild oscillations, while when θ is large (bottom panel) the irregular behavior disappears 2 .
To clarify better our results, we introduce two definitions of market stability:
Definition 2.4 (Weak Stability). The market is weakly stable if there exists an interval
Schied and Zhang (2018) showed that when the trading time grid is equispaced, T N , and under general assumptions on G, the market is not strongly but only weakly stable where I, the stability region, is equal to [θ * , +∞) where θ * = G(0)/4. Thus, they showed the existence of a critical value of θ such that for smaller values of this threshold the equilibrium strategies exhibit oscillations of buy and sell orders for both traders. Hence, the behavior at zero of the kernel function plays a relevant role for the equilibrium stability.
As mentioned in the introduction, this result has been proved for a market with only M = 1 asset, two homogeneous traders (same θ and same trading speed), and J = 2 agents. In this work we extend this stability result by first extending the framework of Schied and Zhang (2018) Figure 1: Blue lines exhibit the price process when both agents have inventory equals to 1. The top (bottom) panel shows the dynamics when θ = 0.01 (θ = 1.5). The trading time grid has N + 1 = 51 points, G(t) = exp(−t), the volatility of the unaffected price process is fixed to 1 and S 0 = 100. The vertical grey dotted lines delineates the trading session. The yellow lines shows the drift dynamics due to trading.
in the multi-asset (M > 1) case and solving the related Nash equilibrium. We then present an extension of the framework in a multi-agent market (J > 2), where we analyse numerically the Nash equilibrium and the market stability. Finally, we study the Nash equilibrium also when the two players are heterogeneous with different transaction costs and trading velocity.
Multi-asset market impact games
As a first extension of the basic setting, we consider the case of two agents trading a portfolio of M > 1 assets. Indeed, agents often liquidate portfolio positions, which accounts in trading simultaneously many assets. In general, the optimal execution of a portfolio is different from many individual asset optimal executions, because of (i) correlation in asset prices, (ii) commonality in liquidity across assets (Chordia et al. (2000) ), and (iii) cross-impact effects. In the following we will focus mainly on the third effect, even if disentangling them is a challenging statistical problem.
To proceed, we first extend the notion of admissible strategy to the multi-asset case. Straightforwardly, given a fixed time grid T and inventory Z 0 ∈ R M , the matrix Ξ = ξ 0 , ξ 1 , . . . , ξ N ∈ R M ×(N +1) of random variables is an admissible strategy if (i) ξ k ∈ R M is F t k -measurable and bounded ∀ k and (ii) Z 0 = N k=0 ξ k . Consistently with the previous notation, for each trading time ξ k and η k are M -vectors containing the order flows for the M -assets of the two agents X and Y , i.e. η k,i is the order flow of the first agent when trading asset i ar time t k . Finally, X 0 , Y 0 ∈ R M are the initial inventories of the two agents.
The second important point is that the trading of one asset modifies also the price of the other asset(s). This effect is termed cross-impact. While self-impact may be attributed to a mechanical and induced consequence of the order book, the cross-impact may be understood as an effect related to mispricing in correlated assets which are exploited by arbitrageurs betting on a reversion to normality, see Almgren and Chriss (2001) and Schneider and Lillo (2019) for further details. Cross-impact has been empirically studied recently, see e.g. Mastromatteo et al.
(2017), Schneider and Lillo (2019) and its role in optimal execution has been highlighted in Tsoukalas et al. (2019) .
Mathematically cross-impact is modeled by introducing a function Q : Then, we assume that Q = Q · G(t) where Q is linear and symmetric, i.e., Q ∈ R M ×M and Q = Q T and G : R + → R. Also, we assume that Q is a nonsingular matrix. Therefore, the price process during order execution is defined as
where we refer to Q ∈ R M ×M as the cross-impact matrix, S 0 t ∈ R M is the unaffected price process which is right-continuous martingale defined on a suitable probability space.
Finally, we opportunely generalize the notion of expected costs of a strategy and we extend the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Definition 3.1 (Expected Costs). Let (ε k ∈ R M ) k=0,1,...,N be an i.i.d. sequence of Bernoulli (1/2) rvs which are independent of σ(∪ t F t ) and mutually independent. The cost of Ξ given H is defined as
T is the Hadamard product, which means for each trading time k and each asset i the time priority is decided by a Bernoulli game. The cost of H given Ξ is defined as
The previous definition is motivated by the following argument. When only X trades, the prices are moved from S
However, the order is executed at the average price and the player incurs in the expenses
Then, Y trades immediately after X and the prices are moved linearly from S
We derive a compact formula for the expected costs which will be used for deriving the equation determining the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove the following lemma:
All the proofs are given in Appendix A.
Nash equilibrium for the linear cross impact model
We now prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in this multi-asset setting. This is easily achieved by using the spectral decomposition of Q to orthogonalize the assets, which we call "virtual" assets, so that the impact of the orthogonalized strategies on the virtual assets is fully characterized by the self-impact, i.e., the transformed cross impact matrix is diagonal. Thus, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium derives immediately by following the same argument as in Schied and Zhang (2018) .
The notion of Nash equilibrium is generalized as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Nash Equilibrium). Given the time grid T and initial values
that:
Remark 3.4. If we suppose that Q is the identity matrix, then the multi-asset market impact game is a straightforward generalization of the Schied and Zhang (2018) model. Indeed, each order of the two players for the i-th stock does not affect any other asset. So, the Nashequilibrium can be easily found by solving M Schied and Zhang (2018) models.
Let us consider the spectral decomposition of Q, i.e., QV = V D, where V is the eigenvectors matrix and D the diagonal matrix which contains the respective eigenvalues. Since we assume that Q is a non singular symmetric matrix, then D is diagonal with all elements different from zero. We define the prices of the virtual assets as P t := V T S Ξ,H t and we observe that
where
These last two quantities are the strategies of the two traders in the virtual assets. Also the inventory of the agents is transformed by V T .
Since the virtual assets are mutually orthogonal by construction, the decay kernel is multiplied by the eigenvalues of the cross impact matrix, i.e., for each trading time t k ,
. . .
Then, we can find for each virtual asset the Nash equilibrium using the Schied and Zhang (2018) results. Finally, given the optimal strategies Ξ * ,P and H * ,P for the virtual assets we can recover the Nash equilibria for S Ξ,H t using the inverse transformation, ξ * k = V ξ * ,P k and η * k = V η * ,P k .
Types of agents
To understand the rich phenomenology that can be observed in a multi-asset market impact game, we introduce three types of traders:
• the Fundamentalist wants to trade one or more assets in the same direction (buy or sell).
Notice that a Fundamentalist can have zero initial inventory for some assets;
• the Arbitrageur has a zero inventory to trade in each asset and tries to profit from the market impact payed by the the other agents;
• the Market Neutral has a non zero volume to trade in each asset, but in order to avoid to be exposed to market index fluctuations, the sum of the volume traded in all assets is zero 3 .
We remark that an Arbitrageur is a particular case of a Market Neutral agent in the limit case when the volume to trade in each asset is zero. Clearly in a single-asset market we have only two types of the previous agents, since a Market Neutral strategy requires at least two assets.
Cross Impact Effect and Liquidity Strategies
The presence of multiple assets and of cross impact can affect the trading strategy of an agent interested in liquidating only one asset. In particular, as we show below, it might be convenient for such an agent to trade (with zero inventory) the other asset(s) in order to reduce transaction costs.
To prove this we focus on the two-asset case, M = 2, and we analyse the Nash equilibrium when the kernel function has an exponential decay 4 , G(t) = e −t . The first trader is a Fundamentalist who has to liquidate the position in the first asset, i.e., X 1 0 = 1, while the second agent is an Arbitrageur, i.e., Y 1 0 = 0. We set an equidistant trading time grid with 26 points and θ = 1.5. The second asset is available for trading, but let us consider as a benchmark case when both agents trade only the first asset. This is a Schied and Zhang (2018) game. Figure 2 exhibits the Nash Equilibrium for the two players. We observe that the optimal solution for the Fundamentalist is very close to the classical U-shape derived under the Transient Impact Model (TIM) 5 , i.e. our model when only one agent is present. However, the solution is asymmetric and it is more convenient for the Fundamentalist to trade more in the last period of trading. This can be motivated by observing that at equilibrium the Arbitrageur places buy order at the end of the trading day, and thus she pushes up the price. Then, the Fundamentalist exploits this impact to liquidate more orders at the end of the trading session. We remark that the Arbitrageur earns at equilibrium, since her expected cost is negative (see the caption). Now we examine the previous situation when the two traders solve the optimal execution problem taking into account the possibility of trading the other asset. We define the cross impact matrix Q = 11 , where q = 0.6. In Figure 3 we report the optimal solution where the inventory of the agents are set to be X 0 = 1 0
wants to liquidate only one asset, but, as clear from the Nash equilibrium, the cross-impact influences the optimal strategies in such a way that it is optimal for him/her to trade also the other asset. In terms of cost, for the Fundamentalist trading the two assets is worse off than in the benchmark case (see the values of E[C T (Ξ * |H * )] in captions). However, if the Fundamentalist trades only asset 1 and Arbitrageur trades both assets, the former has a cost of 0.4935 which is greater than the expected costs associated with Figure 3 . Thus, the Fundamentalist must trade the second asset if the Arbitrageur does.
For completeness we compare the expected costs when the two agents may decide to trade i) both assets, i.e., they consider market impact game and cross-impact effect, or ii) one asset, i.e., they only consider the market impact game. Table 1 exhibits the expected costs of both 4 All our numerical experiments are performed with exponential kernel as in (Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) ). Schied and Zhang shows that the form of the kernel does not play a key role for stability, given that the conditions given above are satisfied.
5 Given the initial inventory X0, the optimal strategy in the standard TIM is ξ = X 0
θ e, see for further details Schied and Zhang (2018) . Table 1 : Payoff matrix of expected costs when the Fundamentalist and Arbitrageur inventories are equal to (1 0) T and (0 0) T , respectively. We have highlighted in red the Nash Equilibrium associated with this payoff matrix .
Fundamentalist and Arbitrageur and it is clear that both agents prefer to trade both assets.
Actually, the state where both agents trade two assets is the Nash equilibrium of the game where each agent can choose how many assets to trade.
The solution presented above is generic, but an important role is played by the transaction cost modeled by the temporary impact. When the temporary impact parameter θ increases, the benefit of the cross-impact vanishes, and the optimal strategy of the Fundamentalist tends to the solution provided by the simple TIM with one asset and no other agent. We find that the difference between these expected costs is negative, i.e. it is always optimal to trade also the second asset, but converges to zero for large θ.
Market instability and cross impact structure
In this Section we study whether the increase of the number of assets and the structure of cross impact matrix help avoiding oscillations and market instability at equilibrium according to the We first show that instabilities are generically observed also in the multi-asset case and that actually more assets make the market less stable. For simplicity let us consider M = 2 assets and a game between a Fundamentalist and an Arbitrageur (similar results hold for different combinations of agents). We choose G(t) = e −t , the cross impact equal to Q = 1 0.9 0.9 1 , and we consider θ = 0.25; remember that for the one asset case the market is stable for this value of θ. Figure 4 shows that for this value of θ the strategies are oscillating and therefore the market is not strongly stable. More surprisingly, the fact that oscillations are observed for θ = 0.25
indicates that the transition between the two stability regimes depends on also on the number of assets and that more assets require larger values of θ to ensure stability. In the following we prove that this is the case and we determine the threshold value. Figure 4 shows also the case θ = 0. Notably, in this case the oscillations in the second asset disappear. This is due to the fact that, since Γ 1 0 , (Γ 2 0 ), the Γ matrix associated with the first (second) virtual asset is equal to (1 + q)Γ, ((1 − q)Γ), the combination of "fundamental" solutions v and w are the same for the two virtual assets. Thus, at the equilibrium the two solutions for the second asset are exactly zero. We have shown in a simple setting that having more than one available asset does not help improving the strong stability of the market and increases the threshold value between stable and unstable markets. We show that when the number of assets tends to infinity the market does not satisfy the weak stability condition.
In the one asset setting, if we choose a sufficiently large θ the instability vanishes. Therefore, this raises the question whether the equilibrium instability is still present when the number of assets increases. To this end we introduce the definition of asymptotic stability.
Definition 4.1 (Asymptotically weakly stable). The market is asymptotically weakly stable if it is weakly stable when M → ∞.
Given this definition, we prove the following: Theorem 4.2 (Asymptotic Instability). Suppose that G is a continuous, positive definite, strictly positive, log-convex decay kernel and that the time grid is equidistant. Let (λ i ) i=1,..,M be the spectrum of the cross-impact matrix Q. The market is unstable if θ < θ * where
Moreover, if the largest eigenvalue of the cross-impact matrix diverges for M → ∞, i.e.
lim M →+∞ λ max = +∞, then the market is not asymptotically weakly stable.
The theorem tells that the instability of the market is related to the spectral decomposition of the cross-impact matrix, i.e. to the liquidity factors. We analyze some realistic cross-impact matrices and their implications for the stability of the Nash equilibrium. Schneider and Lillo (2019) have derived constraints on the structure of the cross-impact for the absence of dynamic arbitrage. They showed that the symmetry of the cross-impact matrix is one of these conditions. Mastromatteo et al. (2017) estimated the cross-impact matrix on 150 US stocks showing that it is roughly symmetric and has a block structure with blocks related to economic sectors. Therefore, we focus on symmetric positive definite cross-impact matrix. The positive definiteness is required in order to have a positive kernel on the virtual assets, recall Subsection 3.1 where it is shown that for each virtual assets i the decay kernel is given by G(t − t k ) · λ i , for all trading times t k , where λ i is the i-th eigenvalue of Q. We consider the following cases:
• One Factor Matrix. We say that Q is a one factor matrix if Q = (1 − q)I + q · ee T , where e = (1, . . . , 1) T ∈ R M and q ∈ (0, 1). The bounds on q guarantee the positive definiteness of the cross-impact matrix. Then it holds:
Corollary 4.3. If the cross-impact matrix is a one factor matrix, then the market is not asymptotically weakly stable.
This implies that when M increases the transactions cost θ must raise in order to prevent market instability, since θ * = G(0)λ max /4 ∼ G(0)qM/4, because λ max = 1 + q(M − 1). orders. Notice that in the one asset case this value of θ gives a stable market. We observe that the eigenvector corresponding to λ max is given by e, which represents an equally weighted portfolio. As a consequence, if we consider a Market Neutral agent against an Arbitrageur the solution becomes stable ∀ θ > (1 − q)/4, since both traders have zero inventory on the first virtual asset. Thus, oscillations might disappear when the inventory of the agents in the first virtual asset is zero.
A generalization of the above model considers Q as a rank-one modification matrix, i.e.
and β ∈ R M is a fixed vector. In this way the cross impact is not the same across all pairs of stocks. We find again that the market is not asymptotically stable because the threshold increases with M . Differently from the previous case this is observed also in the case of a Market Neutral against an Arbitrageur.
• Block Matrix. We now assume that the cross impact matrix has a block structure in such a way that cross impact between two stocks in the same block i is q i , while when the two stocks are in different blocks the cross impact is q. As mentioned above, this is consistent with the empirical evidence in Mastromatteo et al. (2017) . Let us denote with M i the number of stocks in block i, (i = 1, . . . K), and let Q i = (1 − q i )I + q i · e i e T i ∈ R M i × R M i with q i ∈ (0, 1) and e i = (1, . . . , 1) T ∈ R M i , where K is the number of blocks. We define the cross impact matrix as:
If the average number of stocks of a cluster tends to infinity when M goes to infinity, we prove an analogue result as for the one factor matrix case:
Corollary 4.4. If Q is a block matrix, where each block is a one factor matrix, if lim M →+∞ M K → +∞, then the market is not asymptotically weakly stable. The cross impact matrix is a block matrix with K = 10. The figure exhibits the equilibria related to one (the first) asset for each block. The trading time grid is an equidistant time grid with 26 points. Each block has a cross-impact q i equal to 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9 for i = 1, 2, . . . , 9 and 0.95 for the last one.
As an example, we consider K = 10 equally sized blocks from an universe M = 2, 000 assets and set q = 0.1. With this kind of cross impact matrix, we have K large eigenvalues whose eigenvectors correspond to virtual assets displaying oscillations. The optimal trading strategies for stocks belonging to the same block are the same. Thus in Figure 7 we show the Nash equilibrium for the first asset in each of the 10 blocks when the two agents are a Market Neutral and an Arbitrageur. The oscillations are evident, as expected, in all traded assets.
We now study how the critical value θ * varies when the number of assets increases for different structures of the cross impact matrix and therefore of the liquidity factors. Comparing different matrix structures is not straightforward since the critical value depends on the values of the matrix elements. To this end we consider the set of symmetric cross impact matrices of M assets having one on the diagonal and fixed sum of the off diagonal elements. More precisely let h ∈ R, then we introduce for each M the set
One important element of this set is the cross impact matrix Q 1f ac ∈ R M ×M of a one factor model (see above) with off-diagonal elements equal to 2h/M (M − 1). In Appendix A we prove the following:
Theorem 4.5. For a fixed h ∈ R, let us consider the related one-factor matrix Q 1f ac ∈ A M h , then
i.e. among all the matrices with one in the diagonal and constant sum of the off-diagonal terms, the one-factor matrix (i.e. where all the off-diagonal elements are equal) is one with the smallest largest eigenvalue.
Moreover, we prove in the last part of Appendix A that the previous is not a strict inequality, by showing that both a diagonal block matrix, with identical blocks, and the one-factor matrix have the same maximum eigenvalue.
This theorem implies that among all the cross impact matrices belonging to A M h , the one factor case is among the most stable cross-impact matrices. For example, it is direct to construct an example of a block diagonal cross impact matrix with non-zero off block elements (i.e. similar to what observed empirically) and to prove that its critical θ * is larger than the critical value for the one factor matrix having the same value h of total cross-impact.
Instability in market impact games with many agents
We now consider J > 2 agents trading the same asset (i.e. M = 1) in order to study how the stability of the market is influenced by an increasing competition. This model represents another important generalization of Schied and Zhang (2018) which considered only the case
The unaffected price process S 0 t is always assumed to be a right continuous martingale in a suitable probability space. We denote with ξ j k the order flow of agent j at time t k , so that the affected price process is defined as
and we define ξ j := (ξ j 0 , ..., ξ j N ) T . In order to derive the equation for the expected costs of each agent, we need to consider all the possible time priorities among the J traders at each time step. To this end we assume that for each trading time t k there is a random permutation which determines the time priority, i.e., ∀k σ k : {1, 2, . . . , J} → {1, 2, . . . , J}, where σ k (j) denotes the position of the j-th agent at time t k . Then, let
so if we consider all the possible time priorities among the J agents, we obtain for the expected costs,
0 denotes the inventory of the j-th agent. We observe that the trader j pays the cost only of the other agents trading before her. Thus at time t k , this cost is given by
where the indicator function in the first sum selects when the trader j is in position i in the arrival queue and the second sum gives the cost of agents trading before the j-th trader. Also,
In order to compute the expected cost, we need to average over all the permutations of traders' arrival at each time. We prove the following important Lemma useful for the numerical study of equilibrium.
Lemma 5.1.
We now analyse numerically the Nash equilibrium emerging from the interaction of different types of agent. Unless otherwise specified, we fix θ = 10 and N = 15. Moreover we introduce a scaling parameter β ≥ 0 for the kernel function when J increases, i.e., G(t) = J −β e −t . The case when β = 0 corresponds to the additive case, while for β = 1 the total instantaneous impact does not depend on the number of agents. Hence, when β = 1 the aggregate impact of all the agents is independent from J and we want to test whether the trading patterns are also independent from it. Recent empirical evidences (Bucci et al. (2020) ) show that market impact depends on the aggregate net order flow of the optimal executions simultaneously present, without individually distinguishing them.
To this end, we first study an homogeneous market with J identical Fundamentalist sellers with the same initial inventory. In Figure 8 we report the Nash equilibria for the agents when β = 0, 1/2, 1 and for different values of J. We remark that for each β the initial inventory X for all agent j, is rescaled by J −β , and then, for improve readability, the displayed solutions are normalized such that the sum of orders is equal to 1.
When the competition in the market increases, regardless of β, the optimal solution tends to place more orders at the beginning of the trading sessions, instead of waiting the last trading time. This synchronized trading of all the agents at the beginning of the trading period, as resulting from the Nash equilibrium, could be at the origin of the market instability. On the other hand, when β increases the equilibrium seems to be approximated by a flat straight line with a constant trading volume over time. In any case, it is important to notice that when β = 1 the Nash equilibrium is not independent from the number of agents J. Thus, for example, the equilibrium of J = 2 agents is not the same as the equilibrium of J = 4 agents with half the impact and half the initial inventory 6 .
We now consider, in the same setting as above, how the stability of the market depends on the number of agents and on the scaling parameter β. Specifically, we compute numerically the critical value of θ after which the market is not stable. We choose a time grid equal to N = 6 and we study the three cases when β = 0, 1/2, 1 by increasing the number of agents. We find that the increase of competition of the market, i.e. a larger number of agents competing for the same objective, deteriorates its stability increasing θ * (see Figure 9 ). For β = 0 the points lie approximately on a line and the addition of an agent increases θ * by approximately 0.4. On the other hand, the instability seems to be relaxed when the scaling parameter increases, where the relation with J becomes flatter. Notice however that when β = 1, i.e. the total impact of agents becomes approximately independent from J, θ * → 0.4 when J increases, and this asymptotic value is larger than the one for two agents which is θ * = 0.25/2. We conclude that the increase of the competition in a market may deteriorates its stability and, less surprisingly, it increases the expected costs of a strategy. Now we consider the cases when the agent are of different types. In particular, we focus on the role of an Arbitrageur when two other agents are either identical or of opposite type. First, we consider the case of two identical Fundamentalist sellers and one Arbitrageur (J = 3) and we fix θ = 1.5. Figure 10 (left) displays the equilibrium solution for β = 0, to be compared with the two agent case of Fig. 2 . While the trading pattern of the Arbitrageur is qualitatively similar to the one of the two agent case, the Fundamentalists trade significantly less toward the end of the day. This is likely due to the fact that it might be costly to trade for one Fundamentalist given the presence of the other. The expected costs for the two Fundamentalists is equal to 0.9125 and −0.0885 for the Arbitrageur.
We then consider the case of a Fundamentalist buyer, a Fundamentalist seller and an Arbitrageur in order to see whether this last agent is able to exploit, as a sort of market maker, his/her position. Figure 10 (right) shows the Nash equilibrium for this case. It is clear that the Arbitrageur barely trades and the expected costs are 0.13 and −3.98 · 10 −07 for the two Fundamentalists and the Arbitrageur, respectively. This indicates that the two Fundamentalists are able to reduce significantly their costs with respect to the previous case, increasing their protection against predatory trading strategies and that the Arbitrageur is not able to act as a market maker. On the other hand, we observe (see the inset of Fig. 10 ) that the solution for the Arbitrageur starts to exhibit some oscillations of purchase and sale, although his/her orders remains of negligible size with respect to that of Fundamentalists.
Instability and heterogeneity of agents' trading skills
Here we study the case of two agents trading one asset, but, differently from Schied and Zhang (2018), we assume that the two agents are different in their trading skills. We consider separately three sources of heterogeneity: different permanent impact, different temporary impact (or trading fees), and different trading speed.
In the first setting, we study the case when the two agents affect with a different impact the price process. This might correspond to more sophisticated traders who are able to trade more efficiently, for example using better algorithms for posting orders in the market. There is an alternative interpretation, more in line with traditional market microstructure. Permanent impact is considered a measure of the informativeness of trades, thus an agent with a very small permanent impact might be interpreted as a noise trader. In our model the two interpretations are indistinguishable. For analytical convenience, we assume the kernel G(t) is the same for the two agents and we introduce two scaling parameters β i (i = 1, 2) such that the price process dynamic affected by trading becomes 7
where J = 2. We observe that when two agents have different β's this does not compromise the market stability. Indeed, the previous equation can be rewritten as
where ξ k , η k are the strategies associated with the transformed inventories
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of equation 4 is related to the equilibrium of equation 5, i.e., the are equal up to constants, and in particular the stability is not compromised.
We just mention that if, for instance, β 1 = 0 and β 2 = 1, i.e. the impact of the second agent is half the one of the first agent, and both agents are Fundamentalist sellers, the sophisticated (or uninformed) agent Y has the advantage as if he/she should trade half of his volume. Figure   11 exhibits the Nash equilibrium for both traders. As expected, the optimal trading pattern is different for the two traders. More interestingly, the trading profile of the agent with small impact resembles the one of an Arbitrageur (see for comparison Fig. 2 ). Thus, from the point of view of the trading profile, an Arbitrageur with zero inventory or a Fundamental trader with small impact behaves in a similar way at equilibrium. Remember that the latter can be seen either as a skilled trader or as a noise trader. Moreover, the expected cost for the β = 0 and β = 1 sellers are equal to 0.6521 and 0.2582, respectively. When both agents have β = 0, the costs are equal to 0.7975, thus the reduction of impact of one agent is indeed beneficial to both traders.
In the second setting, we consider two agents with different temporary impact parameter θ. This might correspond to the again to the case where one of the two agents has more sophisticated trading strategy or to a market where different class of traders are allowed to pay different fees. This is indeed quite standard for example in ATS where liquidity providers have lower fees than liquidity takers. In particular, we want to test whether only one agent with θ below threshold is sufficient to destabilize the market or if both agents must have θ < θ * .
We denote with θ X and θ Y the temporary impact parameter for the two agents. We study the Nash equilibrium by solving numerically the Schied and Zhang (2018) where both agents are Fundamentalist seller with X 0 = Y 0 = 1. When both agents are above Figure 12 ), we observe that the more significant difference between the two solutions is in the trading schedule of low θ agent, who trades more at the beginning of the trading session. It is interesting to consider the changes in cost. When θ = 1 for both agents, the individual cost is 0.7970. Suppose now that θ Y is reduced to 0.5 (for example because a new type of agent enters the market or because the fee schedule changes for some class of traders). As expected, the expected cost of agent Y is reduced (0.7317), but there is a negative effect on the other agent X who sees her cost soar to 0.8286. Thus, the decrease of θ for a class of agents impacts negatively the other market participants.
When we examine the case when one of the agents has a θ Y smaller than the critical value θ * = 0.25, we find numerical evidences that the equilibrium becomes unstable also for the Fundamentalist agent X for which θ X > θ * . This suggests that in a market with few sophisticated traders with small temporary impact (HFTs) or agents allowed to pay lower fees, the instability comes up for all the agents in the market, regardless for their own θs. In other words, market instability is driven by the agent with the smallest θ and having even few sophisticated traders (in terms of costs or fees) destabilizes the market.
The third and last setting assumes that the two traders are different because one of the two is faster than the other. A fast trader could represent, for example, an HFT. In market impact games one has to decides who arrives first in the market at each time step, because the laggard is going to pay the impact of the trade of the leader. In the standard setting, this is decided by a fair Bernoulli trial, which means that on average each trader is the leader half of the times.
We modify this and for each trading time t k the Bernoulli game ε k deciding the trading priority, where ε k = 1 means that Y places the k-th order before X, so that X has to take into account the impact of Y in her cost. Let us denote with ξ (η) the Nash equilibrium for X (Y ), then we Figure 13: Nash equilibrium in function of the trading speed p (probability of arriving first on the market) of Y . The red dotted lines are the Nash equilibrium when both traders have the same trading speed, i.e., p = 0.5. The time grid has 16 points, θ = 1 and G(t) = exp(−t). Figure 13 exhibits the Nash equilibrium of the two traders for several values of p and Table   2 reports the corresponding expected costs. We observe that when p increases, the optimal solution for the HFT Y is to liquidate slightly faster in the first period and then sell the remaining part of the inventory with a lower intensity, with respect to the solution with p = 0.5, at the end of the trading session. For the slow trader X the behavior is exactly opposite to the one of the fast trader. However the differences between Nash equilibria for different p are quite small, while the greatest benefit for the HFT is the smaller trading costs (see Table 2 ).
Finally, we ask whether the presence of a fast trader modifies the critical value of θ when the instability starts. Figure 14 shows how θ * varies as a function of the trading speed p for a games between two Fundamentalist sellers 8 . Since we compute the critical value using a numerical method there are some small oscillations. We observe a small but significant trend of θ * as a function of p. This result indicates that the presence of an HFT makes the market more prone to oscillations and instabilities. However the effect is relatively small compared to the other possible sources of instabilities studied in the previous sections.
Conclusions
In this paper we used market impact games to investigate several potential determinants of market instabilities driven by finite liquidity and simultaneous trade execution of more agents.
Specifically, we extended the results of Schied and Zhang (2018) in several directions. We first considered a multi-asset market where we introduced the cross-impact effect among assets.
We solve the Nash equilibrium, we analysed the optimal solution provided by the equilibrium, and we studied the impact of transaction costs on liquidation strategies. Secondly, we studied the stability of the market when the number of assets increases and we found that for most realistic cross-impact structures the market is intrinsically unstable. Even if asymptotically the instability arises in all cases, we found that when the structure of the cross-impact matrix is complex, for example it has a block or multi-factor structure, the instability transition occurs for higher values of the impact parameter. Thus, all else being equal, the temporary impact (or the transaction fees) must be larger in order to observe stability. We also generalize the market impact game of Schied and Zhang (2018) to a multi-agent setting and we found clear evidence that more competition in the market compromises its stability. Finally, we consider how the impact of heterogeneous agents affects the stability of the market, considering both different impact or transaction costs and different access speed to the markets among the traders. While the presence of a single agent with low transaction cost is sufficient to undermine stability, we found that differential speed (e.g. a HFT) modifies only slightly the transition between the stable and unstable phase of the market.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We observe that
and we conclude that
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We first observe that when we transform the real assets to the virtual ones also the inventories of the traders are transformed. Indeed, if P t denotes the virtual assets,
where V is the matrix where the columns are the eigenvectors of Q, D is the diagonal matrix which contains the associated eigenvalues, and ξ P k and η P k are the orders of the two traders related to the virtual assets. In particular if X 0 is the inventory of X, by definition
where X 0 represents the virtual inventory of player X. We observe that the i-th component of X 0 characterizes the solution of the i-th virtual assets. So, for each virtual asset the instability is lead by the correspondent virtual kernel, i.e., the kernel relative to the i-th virtual asset is given by G · λ i , where λ i is the related i-th eigenvalues. Then, for the Schied and Zhang instability result we know that if we want non oscillatory solutions, θ has to be greater than G(0) · λ i /4 for all i. In other words the critical value is given by:
Let us denote with λ * the eigenvalue of Q which diverges when M → ∞. WLOG we may assume that λ 1 = λ * , the first eigenvalue of Q and we denote with v 1 the associated eigenvector.
Then, there exists an inventory X 0 s.t. v T 1 X 0 = 0, since v 1 = 0, so that the solution of the first virtual asset is not trivial. Therefore, when M → ∞ this solution exhibits spurious oscillations ∀ θ ∈ R and we may conclude.
Proof of Corollary 4.3. The eigenvalues of Q are λ 1 = 1 − q + qM and λ 2:M = 1 − q, where v 1 = e, the vector with all 1, is the virtual asset associated with λ 1 . Then, when M → ∞ the first eigenvalue diverges so for Theorem 4.2 we conclude.
Proof of Corollary 4.4. We first note that by Theorem 4.2 it is sufficient to prove that there exists a cluster which is unbounded. Indeed, we observe that
Then by Theorem 8.1.8 pag.443 of Golub and Van Loan (2013) 
denotes the i-th largest eigenvalue of Q and respectively of Q. However, the eigenvalues of Q are given by the eigenvalues of Q i − qe i e T i for i = 1, 2, . . . , K. For each i, λ 1 (Q i − qe i e T i ) = 1 − q i + M i (q i − q) and the rests M i − 1 eigenvalues are equal to 1 − q i . So, if there exists a cluster such that M i is unbounded for any value of θ, then λ 1 (Q i − qe i e T i ) is unbounded and also the respective eigenvalue of Q, so by Theorem 4.2 we conclude that there is no a finite value for θ such that the market is weakly stable.
So, let us first start by fixing the number of cluster to K < ∞. Then, when M tends to infinity at least one of the cluster will increase to infinity, which means that there exists a cluster such that λ 1 (Q i − qe i e T i ) → ∞ and also the respective eigenvalue of Q goes to infinity. Therefore, we conclude for Theorem 4.2.
For the general case we conclude by contradiction. If K(M ) is the number of cluster for a fixed M , and K(M ) → ∞ when M → ∞ then the set {M i : i ∈ N} is unbounded. Indeed, if sup i∈N M i = S < ∞, then the average number of stocks in a cluster is
≤ S for all M and this is in contradiction with the assumptions that lim M →+∞ M K(M ) → +∞. So since {M i : i ∈ N} is unbounded we conclude that there is no finite value of θ such that it is greater than all the eigenvalues of Q when M → ∞.
Proof of Lemma 5.1. WLOG G(0) = 1. We observe that E[1 {σ k (l)<i, σ k (j)=i} · ξ k,i ξ k,j ] = P(A ∩ B) · E[ξ k,i ξ k,j ] where for all l = j, A = {σ k (l) < i} and B = {σ k (j) = i} ∀k. However, To get some intuition on this result, we remind that in the two agents case Schied and Zhang (2018) showed that the solution is characterized by the sum and difference of the inventories, see Equation (1) and (2). Thus, if the two traders have the same inventory the solution is fully characterized by the vector v, which is scaled by the sum of the inventories. Figure 2 of Schied and Zhang (2018) shows the shapes of v and w, and we note that the former is a vector which assigns more trades at the beginning, while w tends to concentrate orders at the end of trading session. Let us suppose that X 1 0 < X 2 0 , then the solution for trader 1 is a linear combination of v and w with opposite signs (thus positive at the beginning and negative at the end), while for the second trader the solution is approximately given by a positive linear combination of v and w (an asymmetric U-shape), so that its equilibrium's shape converges to a U-shape. In particular, in the case of X 1 0 << X 2 0 , at the equilibrium, the first seller will place positive orders at the beginning while at the end he/she will place opposite sign orders.
Let us go back to the J = 4 case. We have observed how the presence of a single small seller does not affect the shapes of the big ones. However, this may be related to market dominance of the big sellers. Indeed, if we analyse the complementary case when there is only one big seller with inventory equal to 37/10 against three small sellers whose inventories are all equal to 1/10, we observe from the bottom right panel of Figure 15 that the optimal schedule for the big sellers approaches to a U-shape like in the J = 2 case, while the small agents behaves similarly to Arbitrageurs. Therefore, in a multi-agent market along with the increasing in competition we have also to take into account another effect which is the market dominance in terms of inventory. Obviously this effect is masked in the J = 2 case. We conclude by conjecturing that when the market is dominated by small agents the optimal schedule for the big sellers approach to a U-shape form, like in the J = 2 case, while its shape is invariant when market is dominated by sellers with the same inventory volume size.
